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When delivering his budget speech on 14 May 
2017, the Minister of Justice and Correctional 
Services voiced his concern that South African 
society was becoming increasingly violent. The 
minister based his opinion on the fact that, over 
a period of 13 years, ‘the number of offenders 
sentenced to 20 years and above increased 
a staggering 439%, while lifers grew 413%’.1 
Although sentencing trends do not directly 
reflect levels of violence in the country, these 
shifts coincide with a continuous increase in the 
There is public concern about the violent nature of crime in South Africa and the continuously 
increasing levels of crime, both of which place a huge burden on the resources of the criminal 
justice system. ‘Bank associated robbery’ is a bank-related robbery (or attempted robbery) of cash, 
committed against a bank client while en route to or from a bank or ATM. Although this phenomenon 
is relatively unknown both in the academe and to the general public, the drastic increase in these 
violent and potentially traumatic crimes puts the general public at risk, and is therefore of particular 
concern to the banking industry and criminal justice practitioners. The impact and consequences 
of these robberies are aggravated by their interaction with the so-called trio crimes: home invasions 
and robbery, business robberies, and vehicle hijacking. In this article the dynamics of bank 
associated robbery are analysed, as well as its interrelationship with the trio crimes.
reported incidents of murder and aggravated 
robbery since 2014.2
Bank associated robbery – or ‘associated 
robbery’ – is a term coined by the banking 
industry as an operational concept. Bank 
associated robbery is 
a bank-related robbery [by association] 
of cash or attempt thereto, committed 
against a bank client or his/her delegate, at 
any stage while en route to or from a bank 
branch, ATM or cash centre or inside the 
branch, to effect a deposit, or, withdrawal.3 
In its simplest terms, therefore, bank associated 
robbery refers to a particular modus operandi 
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where perpetrators target their victims because 
they know that they are carrying cash. 
Minimal literature, whether popular or academic, 
is available on this topic, which can be 
attributed to the fact that the phenomenon 
is relatively unknown and under-researched, 
compared to more conventional bank-related 
crimes such as bank robbery and cash-in-transit 
(CIT) robbery. Apart from the lack of research, 
the unknown extent or so-called ‘dark figure’ of 
bank associated robberies poses a challenge 
for researchers who are trying to estimate the 
magnitude of the phenomenon. The statistics 
provided in this article are based on the ‘known’ 
figure4 of bank associated robberies, for the 
following reasons. First, the South African 
Police Service (SAPS) does not acknowledge 
bank associated robberies as such, but instead 
classifies robberies according to the location 
in which incidents take place. If a victim is 
followed home from the bank, and the crime 
takes place at his or her home, for example, the 
SAPS regards the incident as a home invasion 
and robbery, without necessarily linking it to the 
bank as an initial ‘point of origin’ of the crime. 
If the victim is followed to, and robbed at, his 
or her business premises, it will be categorised 
as a business robbery. If a victim is robbed in 
a public place, the incident may be deemed a 
street robbery or, if the victim is killed, a murder 
coincidental to a street robbery. Second, many 
victims do not report crime – even serious 
crimes. South Africa’s 2016/17 Victims of Crime 
Survey revealed, for instance, that an estimated 
13% of all hijackings and 43% of house 
robberies were not reported to the police.5 
According to the South African Bank Risk 
Information Centre (SABRIC), organised criminal 
groups select ‘spotters’ to identify people who 
are making deposits or withdrawals of cash at a 
bank, after which the information is passed on 
to other members in the group who are in the 
immediate vicinity of the bank. The accomplices 
will then follow victims and rob them at 
their workplace, home, or en route to their 
destination.6 It is very likely that these robbers 
will be armed and will resort to violence if they 
are confronted, or if the victim resists.7
Because of the traumatic and violent nature 
of the crime, bank associated robbery is of 
concern to the banking industry and indirectly 
to the public at large. According to Burger,8 
the increasing levels of violent bank-related 
crimes can be attributed to a shift from crimes 
that present high personal risk, such as bank 
robbery, to crimes that present low(er) personal 
risk – such as bank associated robberies. In 
his opinion, this may explain the upsurge in 
the number of incidents and losses because of 
bank associated robberies.9
Notwithstanding the fact that we know little 
about the actual figures of this crime, it is 
clear from the available statistics that bank 
associated robberies and related cash losses 
have shown a drastic increase over the years. 
In the past 10 years, known incidents of bank 
associated robbery increased from 64 incidents 
reported in 2006 to 1 369 incidents in 2016.10 
Incidents increased by 4% from 2015 to 2016, 
with 695 incidents being reported for the first 
six months of 2017. Cash losses experienced 
by victims during the first six months of 2017 
amounted to R21 million.11 Furthermore, 
from 2014 to June 2017, 27 fatalities and 
69 injuries were recorded by SABRIC as a 
consequence of bank associated robberies, 
which underscores the aggravated nature and 
seriousness of these crimes.12
The aim of this study was to explore the 
phenomenon of bank associated robberies 
as a means to gain insight into this relatively 
unknown crime type. The larger study,13 from 
which this article is drawn, used a mixed 
method approach, and collected data in 2015 
from three stakeholder groups, namely 11 
subject matter experts (SMEs), seven primary 
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victims of associated robberies, and 500 adult 
members of the public who hold bank accounts 
with any South African bank. The information in 
the rest of this article is based on the answers 
obtained from the 11 SMEs, and is thematically 
presented below.
The 11 SMEs were purposively selected, 
and include investigators from the SAPS, 
operational managers from the banking 
industry and a prosecutor from the National 
Prosecuting Authority (NPA). These 
individuals were selected because they 
are knowledgeable on the subject of bank 
associated robberies. Data from this group was 
collected through the use of semi-structured, 
one-on-one, in-depth interviews, which 
were audio recorded (with their permission), 
transcribed and coded thematically.14 
The study suffers from a limitation in that it 
relies heavily on a relatively small group of 
SMEs to provide insight and knowledge about 
the topic at hand. However, there is currently 
little scientific information available about bank 
associated robberies, and as experts on the 
topic, these individuals were able to provide rich 
and in-depth information. Despite this limitation, 
the study makes a contribution to the literature 
on a little-researched field.
The dynamics of bank 
associated robbery
SMEs reported that a gang of bank associated 
robbers is usually made up of two to six 
members, fulfilling the following roles:
Spotter
The role of the spotter is to observe and identify 
potential victims. In most cases, the spotter is 
not part of the robbery. In smaller operations, 
however, one person can take on the role of 
both a spotter and a gunman, although this is 
much riskier. The role of the spotter is crucial 
because the success of the robbery depends 
on the information that the spotter feeds to 
the other group members, who are then 
responsible for executing the attack. Spotters 
are usually older, experienced perpetrators 
who started as gunmen but have transitioned 
into positions of authority within the violent 
crime underworld. As spotters grow older, they 
recruit younger persons who are physically 
stronger to execute the robbery, while they do 
the spotting. 
Spotters may work in tandem, for example 
where there is more than one spotter in 
the same bank, or where there are different 
spotters from the same group located in 
different banks, in the same area and at 
the same time. Spotters work in this way to 
increase the chances of identifying a victim, 
since relying on a single spotter may mean 
missed opportunities in other banks while 
spotting in one bank, or while moving around 
between the banks. Spotters wear expensive 
clothing and use expensive electronic 
technology to create the impression that they 
are in the bank to conduct legitimate business, 
making them difficult for laymen to spot.
Gunman
The gunman uses the information provided by 
the spotter to execute the robbery. Gunmen 
are usually physically stronger, younger men. 
Depending on the size of the group, there 
may be two to three gunmen responsible for 
the execution of the robbery. As mentioned, 
some spotters – especially where a large 
amount of cash is involved – will act as both 
a spotter and a gunman. In one particular 
incident reported by the SMEs, three spotters 
were involved in the bank, with three gunmen 
waiting outside.
Driver
The driver is someone who has good driving 
skills and knowledge of motor mechanics. 
The role of the driver is mainly to ensure that 
the robbers get away from the crime scene 
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safely and thus s/he always sits in the car, 
ready to get away as soon as the robbery has 
been committed and the gunmen are back in 
the vehicle. Taxi drivers are, in some instances, 
recruited as drivers because of their perceived 
good driving skills and knowledge of the roads. 
Resources required
Bank associated robbers require the following 
resources to commit a successful attack:
Vehicles
A gang of bank associated robbers usually 
needs a minimum of two vehicles, depending on 
the size of the gang. One vehicle is commonly 
‘legal’ and the other(s) are hijacked or stolen 
vehicles. The spotters remain as clean as 
possible: their vehicle has legitimate registration 
papers, which reduces the risk that the spotter 
will be caught in possession of a stolen vehicle if 
s/he is stopped by police and linked to the rest 
of the group. The gunmen’s vehicles are more 
frequently stolen or hijacked, although even 
these vehicles often carry registration discs and 
plates that are cloned to match a legitimately 
registered vehicle.
Firearms
Firearms are another essential resource for bank 
associated robbers. Each gunman requires a 
handgun, which means that the number of guns 
needed in the group fluctuates, depending on 
its size. These firearms are generally illegal and 
unlicensed, and, in some instances, rented from 
other criminals. 
Corruption and the illegal trade in firearms 
also play a role in facilitating bank associated 
robberies. Thousands of firearms have been 
stolen from the SAPS and South African 
National Defence Force (SANDF) and ‘have for 
years been, and are still being, used to commit 
crimes around the country.’15 For example, the 
media recently reported that 364 firearms that 
were stolen or lost by the SAPS were involved in 
342 crimes such as murder, vehicle hijacking, 
armed robbery, housebreaking and theft.16 
The Hawks are also investigating possible gun 
smuggling in the Western Cape, including the 
import and export of illegal guns.17 
Cell phones
Perpetrators use cheap cell phones, which 
are discarded after two to three robberies. 
They purchase Subscriber Identifying Module 
(SIM) cards that already comply with the 
Regulation of Interception of Communications 
and Provision of Communication-Related 
Information Act (RICA), because the 
information used during the RICA process 
(i.e. identity number and residential address) 
belongs to someone else. It is consequently 
difficult to trace or intercept these phones. 
Perpetrators use these cell phones to call 
one another, which means that there are no 
text messages that can be used as evidence 
or to link the group members to one another. 
In addition, offenders do not store one 
another’s real contact details, but save them 
under pseudonyms.
Bank accounts
Perpetrators, especially spotters, need to hold 
legitimate bank accounts, particularly with the 
major banks in South Africa, since clients who 
bank at the ‘big four’ banks18 are the main 
targets, as these banks have a bigger client 
base and a larger footprint of both branches 
and ATMs. Interviewees reported that spotters 
must be legal account holders so that they 
have an authentic reason to be in the banking 
hall and may seem to be conducting legal 
business if seen roaming around in the bank. 
Spotters can therefore often be seen loitering 
around the banking hall, filling in deposit slips, 
depositing small amounts (e.g. R50), asking for 
change or plastic bags, or paying their DSTV 
accounts, for example, as a way of passing 
time while they are casing a potential victim.
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Target selection
Where bank associated robberies are 
concerned, Maree explains that there are 
different categories of victims, namely 
individuals, small businesses and stokvels 
(saving clubs). Small businesses and stokvels 
are easy targets, because they do their own 
banking and usually follow a routine, for 
instance doing banking at the same time and 
day of the week, and always at the same bank. 
This routine activity makes observation and 
information gathering easy for criminals.19
Clients increase their chance of being robbed 
by having a lot of money on their person. 
Although some victims are identified beforehand 
(i.e. business owners who are targeted owing 
to their routine), ‘targets’ (victims) are mostly 
selected randomly – for example, those utilising 
bulk tellers20 to withdraw money. If a client 
is seen by the spotter going into the bulk 
teller area, his/her chance of being victimised 
increases. Perpetrators alternate between 
the four major banks, casing each bank for 
potential victims and depending on luck to find 
a target in at least one of the banks. If a victim 
is not found in one of the banks, these robbers 
then move to the next bank, hoping for an 
opportunity to present itself. 
Victims’ demeanour inside the bank may also 
draw attention to them. As one of the SMEs 
pointed out: 
Victims cannot keep quiet, they often 
complain in queues and anyone can hear 
them. They blurt out how much they 
want at the tellers, and sometimes while 
standing in the queue as well. Victims 
choose themselves to be robbed because 
of their behaviour.21
Perpetrators prefer banks situated in malls or 
shopping centres with parking bays in front of 
the bank or that are easily accessible, or where 
different banks are clustered around the same 
area, providing easy access for spotters. There is 
also a lot of movement in shopping malls, which 
means that it is not easy for victims to notice 
when they are being followed. 
Selecting targets in shopping centres or malls 
with only a few shops and with parking bays 
not too far from the bank(s) means that the 
perpetrators can be relatively sure that the 
client is unlikely to be delayed in the mall doing 
shopping after withdrawing money from the bank. 
Instead, bank clients are more likely to go straight 
to their vehicles after completing their business 
in the bank. In such locations, where the parking 
bay is not too far from the bank(s), following the 
client is easier and quicker. Geographical pattern 
analysis undertaken by SABRIC confirms that 
shopping centres or malls closest to highways 
and main roads are also preferred for an easy and 
quick getaway. 
Post-offence behaviour
The group dynamics of a bank associated robbery 
gang emerge from some type of rank hierarchy 
or similar structure. The ‘mastermind’ who plans 
the crime receives the biggest portion of the cash. 
The driver usually gets the smallest cut because 
his/her role is just to wait in the car and drive away 
from the scene, while others, like the gunmen, 
execute the attack. 
The principle of ‘honour among thieves’ appears 
to have little place in these gangs. Lying and 
deception in the ranks is common, and some 
members end up getting a larger share of the 
money than others through ‘misappropriation’ of 
some of the spoils before the actual distribution 
takes place. Because the spotter does not use the 
same vehicle as the gunmen and the driver, s/he 
is at much higher risk of being cheated in this way. 
As such, spotters will, in some groups, play two 
roles – for example, identifying potential targets 
and then also joining the group that executes the 
robbery so as to ensure that they are not lied to 
about the money taken from the victim. 
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Gabor et al. posit that understanding how 
robbers spend the cash that they get from 
robberies will help identify precipitating factors 
with regard to specific crimes.22 Zinn found that 
armed robbers mostly squander their money on 
an extravagant lifestyle, including prostitutes, 
gambling, expensive cars, designer clothes 
and shoes, while a small number of the cash-
in-transit respondents invest the stolen money 
in real estate.23 In her research on the criminal 
careers of armed robbers, Thobane reports that, 
depending on their stage of life, robbers spend 
the loot in different ways.24 Young individuals 
mostly use their share to finance lavish lifestyles 
and recreational substance abuse, while more 
mature persons use the money for their daily 
expenses, savings and to pay off debts they 
may have accumulated. 
Experts interviewed for this study confirmed 
this finding, adding that older individuals will 
generally use their money to take care of 
their families, invest in businesses such as 
taxis, tuck shops or taverns, buy expensive 
furniture and electronic appliances, or 
renovate their houses, whereas younger 
perpetrators will spend their spoils on 
partying and expensive clothes. 
The consequences of bank 
associated robbery
The first impact of bank associated robberies 
on victims is the obvious loss of cash. The 
average sum of cash lost ranges from between 
R30 000 to R160 000 per incident. In one 
rare case, SMEs (who belong to a task team 
that meets weekly) reported that an amount of 
approximately R3 000 000 had been lost.
Furthermore, victims may also suffer serious 
injury or even loss of life, especially where 
perpetrators use force or violence, thus incurring 
further expenses. Victims are also vulnerable to 
other types of victimisation, such as rape, house 
robbery where victims were followed home, 
theft, and restrictions of movement. 
Trio crimes and the link to bank 
associated robbery
Another important dimension of bank 
associated robbery is its interaction with 
other serious violent crimes, specifically the 
so-called trio crimes. These comprise home 
invasions (house robberies), business robberies 
and vehicle hijackings as subcategories 
of aggravated robbery, and may also be 
accompanied by murder. The heightened 
concern about the trio crimes is a result of 
the substantial increases in incidents of these 
respective manifestations of aggravated robbery 
that have been evident since 2006.25 
Recent crime statistics, released by the SAPS 
for the period 1 April 2016 to 31 March 2017, 
once again reflected an upsurge in violent 
crime; especially the trio crimes associated 
with bank associated robberies.26 Aggravated 
robberies appear to have peaked during this 
period: Kriegler demonstrates an increase of 
almost 30% over the five-year period up to 
December 2016,27 and Newham reports that 
these robberies are at their highest level since 
2003, totalling 140 956 recorded incidents in 
2016/17 (an increase of 6.4% over the previous 
year alone).28  
Hijacking shows a similar trend. Incidents of 
motor vehicle hijacking have increased by 
about 13% over the same five-year period to 
2016,29 while in 2016/17 the police recorded the 
highest number of carjackings in the past 10 
years (16 717 reported incidents, representing 
an increase of 14.5% from 2015/16).30 On 
average, then, 45.8 cars were hijacked per day 
in 2016/17 – the majority of them in Gauteng.31
Home invasions doubled during the period 
between 2003 and 2016, and the house 
robbery rate also increased marginally (from 
20 820 to 22 343 incidents) from 2015/16 
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to 2016/17.32 Coupled with these increases, 
Kriegler also argues that crime in South Africa 
is increasingly likely to be characterised by 
physical and violent encounters with offenders.33
Taken together, trio crimes instil fear in members 
of the public owing to the perceived threat of 
their lingering omnipresence, and the sense 
of invasion of one’s perceived sanctuary of 
privacy and security at home, at work, or while 
travelling in a motor vehicle. Newham explains: 
‘These crimes can happen to anyone and are 
highly traumatic to victims, as they are too often 
accompanied by murder, rape and serious 
assault, or the threat of these crimes.’34 Zinn 
argues that a crime such as motor vehicle 
hijacking inhibits people’s freedom of movement, 
and in turn constrains their economic growth. 
Vehicle hijackings have substantial negative 
effects on South Africa, particularly in terms of 
the loss of property and psycho-social harm as 
a result of the trauma and fear experienced by 
victims and society at large.35 Home invasions 
cause significant trauma because homeowners’ 
‘privacy, control and security’ are taken away 
from them. Many victims are accosted and 
exposed to violence:36
[I]n some robberies householders are 
tortured, beaten, physically intimidated and 
verbally abused. On a daily basis South 
African media carry reports and graphic 
descriptions of violent crime, including 
house robberies. The unpredictability and 
prevalence of criminal attacks at homes 
make for extreme levels of insecurity.
Perpetrators of trio crimes are relatively 
organised, and plan their attacks well. Zinn 
shows, for example, that offenders prefer 
vehicle hijackings to motor vehicle theft 
because it is a lucrative crime from which they 
are able to make quick cash without having to 
deal with practical considerations like ‘alarms, 
immobilisers, [and] opening the car door’ as 
well as starting the engine without the key. 
Offenders believe that stealing a vehicle, 
as opposed to hijacking it, increases one’s 
chances of being apprehended.37 
Armed robberies are frequently perpetrated by 
criminal syndicates as part of organised crime.38 
A single robbery will generally yield a high value 
in stolen goods and cash.39 In addition to the 
economic incentives for committing these 
types of aggravated robberies, there is little 
disincentive for perpetrators, as they are seldom 
arrested and successfully prosecuted. Newham 
argues that the combination of strategies they 
employ, including proper planning, the use 
of elements of surprise and force, successful 
escapes and eluding of law enforcement means 
that ‘criminally orientated individuals and groups 
increasingly [recognise] that robbery [is] a low 
risk and high yield enterprise’.40
In the experience of SMEs who were 
interviewed for this research, many perpetrators 
are repeat offenders who started with petty 
crimes and then graduated to bank associated 
robbery. These interviewees report that 
bank associated robbers are also involved 
in aggravated robbery, vehicle hijacking and 
murder. Theft and the hijacking of cars are also 
considered essential parts of bank associated 
robbery, because offenders need vehicles to 
commit these crimes. Consequently, offenders 
will either hijack cars themselves or will link 
up with someone who ‘specialises’ in vehicle 
hijackings to supply them with vehicles. In the 
experience of the SMEs, offenders will not 
hesitate to shoot if confronted. 
According to the SMEs, some of the offenders 
may also commit hijacking and robbery of 
trucks delivering British American Tobacco (BAT) 
products to spaza shops41 in the townships 
(colloquially known among the SMEs as ‘BAT 
robbery’). One SME is also of the opinion that 
there is a strong link between robberies where 
people are followed from airports and bank 
associated robberies, because of a similar 
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modus operandi. One bank associated robber 
has indeed also been convicted for an airport-
following robbery, as confirmed by the SME. 
The characteristics of bank associated 
robbers are similar to those identified by Zinn 
and Newham in that they exhibit elements 
of planning the crime; are drawn by easy 
and quick cash; operate in groups where 
there is a division of roles; and will frequently 
squander the money on maintaining a lavish 
lifestyle. SMEs argue that offenders engage in 
bank associated robbery because the crime 
presents a low personal safety risk and results 
in ‘scoring’ a large amount of money in a 
short period of time. ‘Masterminds’, who are 
older and more experienced, and usually have 
previous convictions for crimes such as robbery 
with aggravating circumstances or business 
robberies, will recruit younger offenders. 
Bank associated robbers meet in the morning 
at taverns or petrol stations to discuss get-
away routes, distribute resources such as 
weapons and cellphones, and assign roles 
to each of the members in the team. Bank 
associated robbers may not be targeting big 
‘scores’ such as banks, for example, but will 
target individuals who have large amounts of 
money in their possession. 
In the process of committing bank associated 
robberies, offenders are presented with 
opportunities to commit other crimes. As 
mentioned, SMEs report, for example, that 
offenders will shoot if victims show resistance 
during the commission of a hijacking. They 
may therefore also be guilty of committing 
murder. SMEs believe strongly that success in 
the prevention of bank associated robberies 
will have a positive impact on the prevention of 
other crimes, particularly the trio crimes, as it 
often constitutes the initial phases of other 
such crimes.
Burger argues that the trio crimes raise ‘the 
biggest concern’ or crime threat of the six 
crime sub-categories clustered under the 
aggravating robbery category.42 Newham 
holds that it is essential to increase crime 
intelligence and analysis capacity in respect 
of trio crimes if we hope to identify and 
detect the perpetrators and their networks.43 
Extending this strategy to include bank 
associated robbery would contribute to the 
combatting of the trio crimes, inclusive of bank 
associated robberies.
Conclusion
It is evident from the data presented above 
that structured, organised gangs are 
responsible for bank associated robberies, 
and that they apply their own strategies and 
tactics with varied success, thereby creating a 
category of crime specialists. Serial offenders 
or the same individuals committing repeated 
crimes are responsible for a large number of 
these crimes. Even though bank associated 
robbery is seen as a highly specialised crime 
characterised by agile motives, criminals are 
also versatile in their offending. Statistics show 
high levels of incidents of house invasions and 
vehicle hijacking, and this study confirms that 
bank associated robberies contribute to the 
incidence of those aggravated robberies. 
In response to the surge in bank associated 
robberies, the SAPS has formed a task team 
to deal specifically with these crimes. In 
addition to these efforts, it would be useful to 
extend intelligence networks devoted to the 
investigation of the trio crimes to include bank 
associated robbery, especially since other trio 
crimes are frequently consequential outcomes 
of bank associated robberies. Improving the 
conviction rates of those who commit bank 
associated robberies may also be used to 
deter potential perpetrators from committing 
these crimes. 
To comment on this article visit 
http://www.issafrica.org/sacq.php
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